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BARCHRIS AND THE REGISTRATION PROCESS*
by

O

John R. Jordan, Jr.**
NE of the most significant court decisions in the history of federal
securities regulation was handed down in March 1968 in the case of

Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corp.1 The decision involved the obliga-

tions and liabilities of company officers, directors, underwriters, counsel
and accountants in connection with registration statements filed under the

federal securities laws. Judge McLean's opinion in this case represents an
important adjudication of the broad spectrum of questions raised by section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 dealing with liability for misstatements or omissions of material facts in registration statements. That section

provides in part:
In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security ... may ... sue
[persons who signed the registration statement, directors of the issuer, underwriters and certain 'experts'].

Several defenses are available to each such person (except the issuer) in
the event of suit. These include:
(1) [T]hat .. . as regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert . . . he had, after reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such
part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading."
[T]hat . . . as regards any part .. . made on the authority of an expert
(other than himself) ... he had no reasonable ground to believe ... at the
time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein .

(2)

Statements made by a person upon his authority as an expert must be de* The author of this Article is a practicing certified public accountant-not a lawyer. Consequently, it is not his purpose to offer legal interpretations, or to present an exhaustive discussion of
civil liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. However, any person who is involved
in the securities registration process should be at least familiar with the Bar Chris decision and
its implications. It is the author's objective to set forth his understanding as a layman of the Bar
Chris opinion and its probable effects on registration procedure based on his post-Bar Chris experience and discussions with a number of attorneys and underwriters.
** B.A., University of Texas; M.B.A., Harvard University. Certified Public Accountant, Dallas,
Texas.

1283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
'Securities Act of 1933, 5 11(a), 15 U.S.C. S 77k(a) (1964). Unless the context indicates
otherwise, any further reference, either in text or in footnotes, to section 11 and subsections should
be assumed to refer to section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Bid. 5 11(b)3(A), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(b)(3) (1964).
4
1d. 5 11(b)3(C), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(b)(3) (1964).
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fended under the standard set forth in (1) above, i.e., reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief.
In determining for the above purposes what constitutes "reasonable investigation" and "reasonable ground for belief," the law provides that
"the standard of reasonableness shall be that of a prudent man in the management of his own property."'
The above provisions pose a number of significant questions: What is a
"material" fact? Who are "experts" within the meaning of the Act? What
parts of a registration statement are made on the authority of experts?
What constitutes "reasonable investigation" and "reasonable grounds for
belief"? To what extent do standards of investigation differ for the various
parties (directors-inside and outside, officers, underwriters, experts, etc.)
who may be liable?
Very few actions have been brought by investors under the civil liability
provisions of the 1933 Act and no decision has meaningfully discussed the
above questions. Accordingly, Bar Chris must be regarded as a landmark
decision. The court commented at length and explicitly on the responsibilities of inside and outside directors, company officers, company counsel
(who was a director), underwriters, underwriters' counsel, and independent accountants. Moreover, the court set forth standards of responsibility
and investigation for some of these parties far beyond those traditionally
assumed in the registration process. Some legal experts feel that some of the
positions and statements of the court were broader than necessitated by
the facts of the case. Nevertheless, most corporate lawyers appear to agree
that in view of the dearth of judicial expressions in these areas, the statements and positions of the court call for serious consideration and a reexamination of procedures and techniques currently being followed.
The Bar Chris opinion is lengthy, and the facts and issues are numerous
and complex. To establish proper understanding and perspective of the
case, a systematic approach will be employed. Some pertinent background
will be presented first, and then the various issues and findings of fact will
be discussed. Each defendant's position will be considered separately. Finally, the implications of the decision will be discussed, together with probable procedural changes in the registration process.
The Bar Chris opinion will be treated at length and in considerable detail for the following reasons: (1) there apparently has been an overreaction to the decision, probably because of misunderstanding of the issues
involved and the court's holdings; (2) some background and discussion of
the facts will give insight into the circumstances and context in which the
registration statement in question was prepared; (3) a detailed examination of the opinion will disclose the extent of each defendant's investigation and the court's holdings with respect thereto.
I.

BACKGROUND

Bar Chris Construction Corporation was engaged in the construction of
bowling alleys. The introduction of automatic pin setting machines in
5Id. S 11(c), 15 U.S.C. 5 77k(c) (1964).
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1952 had given a marked stimulus to bowling; therefore, Bar Chris's alley
construction operations grew rapidly. Its sales increased from $800,000 in
1956 to over $9,000,000 in 1960.
The company's method of operation and financing is of particular importance. In general, it entered into a contract with a customer, received a
small down payment, and constructed and equipped the bowling alley.
When the alley was finished, the customer executed installment notes, payable over a period of years, for the balance due. Bar Chris discounted the
notes with a factor and received a part of their face amount in cash. The
factor retained a portion as a reserve. Bar Chris was contingently liable in
the event a customer defaulted to the extent of fifty per cent of the unpaid balance.
In 1960 Bar Chris began financing alleys in part through a sale and
leaseback arrangement. When the equipment ("interior package") was installed, Bar Chris would sell the "interior package" to a factor who would
in turn lease it either (1) to Bar Chris's customer, or (2) to a subsidiary
of Bar Chris. In the latter case, the subsidiary would lease the "interior
package" to the customer. In both cases, Bar Chris immediately received
the entire proceeds in cash. The company's contingent liability for performance of the lease obligations was limited to twenty-five per cent of
the lease obligation in arrangement (1), but it was one hundred per cent
under arrangement (2).
The company expended considerable sums of money on work in progress before it received reimbursement. This factor, coupled with the rapid
expansion of business, resulted in a chronic shortage of cash.
In December 1959, the company sold common stock to the public. In
early 1961, in order to meet its need for additional working capital, the
company sold $3,500,000 of convertible debentures through an underwriting syndicate. The issue was covered by a registration statement which became effective May 16, 1961.
By the time Bar Chris received the debenture financing proceeds it was
experiencing difficulties in collecting from its customers, several of whom
were in arrears on payments of the discounted notes. The bowling industry was suffering from an overbuilt condition and many inadequately financed alley operators began to fail. Bar Chris continued to build alleys;
however, it also continued to be desperately short of cash. In October 1962
it filed under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and on November 1,
1962 it defaulted on the debenture interest payment then due.
Some of the purchasers of the debentures brought suit under section 11
of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging that the registration statement with
respect to the debentures filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission contained material false statements and failed to state material facts.
Defendants included the persons who signed the registration statements
(inside and outside directors-including the principal officers, the general
' In the instant case, all directors of the issuer signed the registration statement. However, the
law makes directors liable whether or not they sign a registration statement. Id. S 11 (a) (2), 15
U.S.C. S 77k(a) (2)

(1964).
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counsel for the company, a partner in the lead underwriting firm, and several other outside directors-and the controller), the underwriters and the
independent accountants.
II. ISSUES AND HOLDINGS
Broadly stated, the issues before the court on the question of liability
were: (1) did the registration statement contain false statements of fact
and/or did it omit to state facts which should have been stated in order
to prevent it from being misleading; (2) if so, were the misstatements or
omissions "material" as defined under the Act; and (3) if so, did the defendants establish their respective affirmative defenses as provided in the
Act?
A. Misstatements and Omissions
The alleged misstatements and omissions related to the prospectus, which
contained, among other things, a description of Bar Chris's business and
information regarding its real property, subsidiaries, methods of operation,
and financing. The financial information included an audited consolidated
balance sheet at December 31, 1960, with explanatory notes and audited
income statements for the three years then ended. It also contained unaudited net sales, gross profit, and net earnings for the quarter ended
March 31, 1961, and comparative amounts for the 1960 first quarter. Additionally, it stated the company's backlog of unfilled orders at March 31,
1961, compared with March 31, 1960, and Bar Chris's contingent liability
as of April 30, 1961, on customers' discounted notes and under the sale
and leaseback financing arrangements.
Plaintiffs charged that certain of these figures were inaccurate and that
the text contained certain false statements or omitted certain information.
With regard to the 1960 financial statements (audited), the court found
that in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles Bar Chris
recognized sales and gross profit on bowling alleys under construction
based on the percentage completed to a given date. Due in part to use of

erroneous completion percentages and in part to inclusion in "sales" of certain alleys in fact not sold, "sales," "net operating income," and "earnings
per share" for 1960 were misstated as follows:

Sales
Net operating income
Earnings per share

Reported
in the
Prospectus

Determined
by the
Court

Misstatement

$9,165
1,742

$8,511
1,496

$654
246

$ .75

$ .10
$ .65
(figures given in thousands)

With respect to the 1960 balance sheet it was found that current assets
of $4,524,000 were overstated by $610,000 as a result of incorrect inclusion of restricted cash and accounts receivable relating to an alley in fact
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not sold, failure to provide an adequate reserve for doubtful accounts, and
misclassification of all of the factor's reserve as a current asset.
Contingent liabilities were found to be understated by $376,000, due
principally to misinterpretation of the contract contingency provisions regarding contingent liabilities on sale and leaseback transactions. In addition, the company was directly liable for one lease ($325,000) shown as
a contingent liability.
With regard to the 1961 first quarter unaudited figures and contingent
liabilities at April 30, 1961, the pertinent amounts as reported in the prospectus and found by the court were:
Reported
in the
Prospectus
1961 First quarter:
Net sales
Gross profit

Net earnings

$2,138
483

126

Determined
by the
Misstatement
Court
$1,619
252

$520
231

Assumed proportionate to
adjustment of gross profit

Contingent liabilities at
April 30, 1961:
Notes discounted

Sale and leaseback arrangements
Direct lease liability

5,101

5,101

-

619
1,444
314
314
(figures given in thousands)

825
-

The errors were attributable to the same factors as before-inclusion of
intercompany transactions (sales of alleys to subsidiaries) in "sales" and
"gross profits" and misinterpretation of the contingent liability provisions.
In addition to the misstated figures, the court found several errors in the
text of the prospectus.
Backlog. The prospectus stated: 'IleCompany as of March 31, 1960, had
$2,875,000 in unfilled orders on its books. As of March 31, 1961, the comparable amount was approximately $6,905,000. Substantially all of the latter orders are scheduled and are expected to be completed in 1961." The
court stated that " 'unfilled orders on its books' which are 'scheduled,'"
meant in this instance "firm, enforceable contracts with purchasers who
have made their down payments and who can reasonably be expected to
perform their contracts." The court found that these criteria were not
met with respect to some $4,490,000 of the "orders" included in the backlog figure. Thus, the adjusted backlog was approximately $2,415,000, an
amount less than a year earlier.
Officers' Loans. Statements in the prospectus that the maximum amount
of advances by the officers to Bar Chris was $155,615, and that all such
advances had been repaid were false because (1) the recipient officers did
not deposit the checks they received in repayment of their advances until
after Bar Chris received the proceeds of the debenture offering, and (2)
shortly before the effective date there were additional advances by officers
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which had not been repaid and the existence of which was not disclosed. In
the latter case, the officers advanced the funds and simultaneously received
checks in the same amount from the company which the evidence indicated they agreed not to deposit, and did not deposit, until the debenture
proceeds were received. In all, advances by officcrs amounted to approximately $387,000 as of the effective date.
Application of Proceeds. The prospectus stated that $1,745,000 of the
financing proceeds (the amount remaining after providing for the costs of
a new plant, development of a new equipment line, and a loan to a financing subsidiary) was to be employed as "additional" working capital in the
"expansion" of alley construction. In fact, the court found that $1,160,000
of this amount was used to repay bank and officer loans, to pay construction expenses incurred prior to the effective date and to make a loan to a
company owned by friends of an officer of Bar Chris.
Delinquency Experience. The prospectus stated that "[s]ince 1955, the
Company has been required to repurchase less than !/2 of 1% of promissory notes discounted [with] unaffiliated financial institutions." The
court found this statement "literally true" but "impliedly false" because it
suggested that customer delinquency problems were minimal when in fact
such problems were extremely serious at the time the registration statement became effective. A number of customers were seriously in arrears
and Bar Chris was continually negotiating with the factor to avoid repurchasing discounted notes.
Description of Business. The description of the business section was found
to be incomplete and misleading in that it did not disclose that Bar Chris
operated one bowling alley, intended to operate two more, and might, with
impending repossessions, be operating several more alleys in the near future.
B. Materiality of Misstatements and Omissions
The court then turned to the issue of whether the misstatements and
omissions were "material" within the meaning of section 11, a matter of
particular interest to accountants. The Securities and Exchange Commission regulations define "material" as follows: "The term 'material,' when
used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any
subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security registered."' The court refined this test as follows:
A material fact [is] a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed
would have deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from
purchasing the securities in question.
The average prudent investor is not concerned with minor inaccuracies or
with errors as to matters which are of no interest to him. The facts which
'SEC Regs., 17 C.F.R. S 230.405(1)

(1968)

(emphasis added).
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tend to deter him from purchasing a security are facts which have' an important bearing upon the nature or condition of the issuing corporation or its
business.!
These criteria or tests, the court acknowledged, boil down to a question of
judgment "to be exercised by the trier of the fact as best he can in the light
of all the circumstances."'
Judge McLean concluded that "there was no doubt" that all of the misstatements and omissions which related to 1961 were material (i.e., overstatement of sales and gross profit for the first quarter, understatement of
contingent liabilities at April 30, failure to disclose the true facts with
respect to backlog, officers' loans, delinquencies, application of proceeds,
and present and prospective operation of several bowling alleys).
With respect to the misstatements of the 1960 figures, the judge pointed
out that a prudent investor would have known that the debentures were a
speculative investment and that even after adjustment, the sales and earnings growth was "striking." He concluded that, viewed in this context, it
was unlikely that an investor would have been deterred from buying the
securities if he had been apprised of the comparatively minor misstatements of sales and earnings. The same was true of the misstatement of contingencies at December 31, 1960. On the other hand, the court concluded
that the 1960 balance sheet errors which reduced the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities from 1.9 to 1 to 1.6 to 1 were material, on the interesting grounds that "[t]here must be some point at which errors in disclosing a company's balance sheet position become material, even to a
growth-oriented investor."
C. "Due Diligence" Defenses
We now turn to the crux of the opinion-the court's holdings with respect to whether the defendants established their respective affirmative
defenses as provided in the Act. It is here that judicial history was made,
since there had been no previous significant judicial interpretation of the
section of the Act providing for "due diligence" defenses. The judge commented at length on the responsibilities of each of the parties involved in
preparing and signing the registration statement. He also discussed separately the "due diligence" defenses pleaded by the respective defendants,
both with respect to the portions of the registration statement which were
"expertised" and those that were not made on the authority of experts.
The court first established that the only "experts" within the meaning
of the Act were the independent accountants. Some defendants had asserted that Bar Chris's attorneys and the underwriters' attorneys were also
experts and that everything in the registration statement was "expertised"
because the two law firms were responsible for the entire document. However, the court held that "[t]o say that the entire registration statement
'Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681 (S.D.N.Y.
Charles A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934).
'Id. at 682.
10 Id.

1968), citing in re
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is expertised because some lawyer prepared it would be an unreasonable
construction of the statute.""1
This was a crucial preliminary matter because it precluded certain parties such as outside directors and the underwriters from asserting a defense
under section 11 (b) (3) (C) (no reasonable ground to believe untrue, etc.)
and forced them to assert a defense under section 11(b) (3) (A), which
required proof of reasonable investigation and reasonable grounds for belief on their part. Furthermore, it appears that underwriters' counsel (not
otherwise a party to the suit) could have been sued under section 11 (a) (4)
as an "expert" had the court ruled otherwise.
The court then determined what portions were "expertised" (another
matter of particular concern to accountants). The parties asserted three
views as to which portions were expertised: (1) only the 1960 and prior
years audited figures (including notes to the financial statements); (2)
every figure in the prospectus; and (3) the audited figures and that section of the text referred to in a footnote to the balance sheet (a common
cross-referencing practice inserted for the convenience of the reader and
designed to eliminate repetition of text material in the footnotes). The
court held that the narrow view (1) was correct, since the registration
statement contained a report of the independent accountants which clearly covered only the 1960 balance sheet and the income and retained earnings statements for the three years then ended. This, of course, is the way
accountants have always viewed and intended their responsibility.

The Defendants-Signers of the Registration Statement.
Directorand Chief Executive Officer. As chief executive officer he "'knew
all the relevant facts." He was a member of the executive committee, and
he was familiar with all aspects of the business. He personally handled
many of the transactions which figured prominently in the case. He arranged the company's financing and negotiated with the factors; he was
aware of the customer delinquency problems; he was aware of the tight
cash position of Bar Chris, and he personally advanced some $175,000
to the company which remained unpaid at the effective date and which
fact was not disclosed to company counsel or, as we have discussed, in the
registration statement. The court's holding is not surprising: "He could not
have believed that there were no untrue statements or material omissions in
the prospectus. [He] has no due diligence defenses.""2
Director and Chief Financial Officer. A certified public accountant, the
court found that he was thoroughly familiar with the financial affairs of
Bar Chris. As a member of the executive committee, he was kept informed
of the non-financial aspects of the business, such as the present and prospective operation of bowling alleys. He withheld information from the
company counsel and the underwriters' counsel. This officer asserted that
Id. at 683.
'21d. at 684.
"
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he was inexperienced in registration statement matters and that he relied
on counsel and the independent accountants to guide him.
The court, however, held that "[e]ven if he had told [counsel] all the
facts, this would not have constituted the due diligence contemplated by
the statute.""3 Knowing the facts, he had reason to believe that the expertised portion was in part incorrect and he did not have reasonable ground
to believe the rest of the prospectus was true. In fact, "he must have
known that in part it was untrue. Under these circumstances, he was not
entitled to sit back and place the blame on the lawyers for not advising
him about it.""' He had no due diligence defenses.
Other Officers Also Directors. The remaining two director-officers were
the founders of the business; however, they limited their activities principally to the areas of sales and construction supervision. They were men
of limited education who probably found the prospectus difficult to understand (if in fact they read it). However, they were members of the executive committee, and the affairs of the business were discussed at length at
its meetings. They were aware generally of what was going on and had
reason to know that certain information in the prospectus was false. They
also failed to prove their due diligence defenses.
The following statements in the opinion relating to these officers are of
particular interest: "The liability of a director who signs a registration
statement does not depend upon whether or not he read it or, if he did,
whether or not he understood what he was reading .. .there is nothing
to show that they made any investigation of anything which they may
not have known about or understood."' "

Chief Accounting Officer and the Secretary. Although the chief accounting officer had been in the employ of Bar Chris only a short time and
was "a comparatively minor figure" in Bar Chris's management, the court
held that he knew or should have known that certain parts of the prospectus were untrue.
Insofar as the instant case is concerned, the court could have stopped
with this holding. However, Judge McLean expanded on the standards of
responsibility which apply to a signer of a registration statement:
Even if he [believed the entire prospectus to be true], he still did not establish his due diligence defenses .... He failed to prove [as to the unexpertised
portions] that he made a reasonable investigation which afforded him a reasonable ground to believe that it was true. As far as it appears, he made no
investigation. He did what was asked of him and assumed that others would
properly take care of supplying accurate data as to the other aspects of the
company's business. . . .As a signer, he could not avoid responsibility by
leaving it up to others to make it accurate."'

The secretary (also a director and house counsel) was in a position
similar to the chief accounting officer in that his knowledge was limited to
certain aspects of the business. The standard set forth by the court in es1

Id. at 685.
Id.
1Id. at 684-85.
'Oid. at 686.
'4
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tablishing his responsibility is significant: "As a lawyer... he should have
known that he was required to make a reasonable investigation of the truth
of all the statements in the unexpertised portion of the document which
he signed."'
Neither officer established his due diligence defenses except the secretary
as to the expertised portion.
Outside Directors.The court commented at some length on the responsibility of an outside director who was a commercial banker and who became
a member of the board after the registration statement in its original form
had already been filed. He signed the signature page for the first and second amendments, the latter constituting the registration statement in its
final form. He never saw the registration statement in its final form, and
he relied on the assurances of the officers of the company as to the accuracy
and completeness of the information contained therein and on certain general credit inquiries he had made prior to joining the board.
The court held that he had established his due diligence defense with
respect to the expertised portion because he was acquainted with the firm
of independent accountants and had confidence in them and relied upon
them. With respect to the unexpertised portions, the court held that he
had not established his due diligence:
Section 11 imposes liability in the first instance upon a director, no matter
how new he is. He is presumed to know his responsibility when he becomes
a director. He can escape liability only by using reasonable care to investigate
the facts which a prudent man would employ in the management of his own
property. In my opinion, a prudent man would not act in an important
matter without any knowledge of the relevant facts, in sole reliance upon
persons who are comparative strangers and upon general information which
does not purport to cover the particular case. To say that such minimal conduct measures up to the statutory standard would, to all intents and
purposes, 8 absolve new directors from responsibility merely because they
are new.2
Several points regarding this outside director are worth noting. First, he
made a general investigation of the company before joining the board.
This included obtaining a Dun & Bradstreet report and making inquiries of
Bar Chris's banks and of Bar Chris's principal factor. All inquiries produced satisfactory responses. He subsequently obtained a copy of Bar
Chris's 1960 annual report and noted the report of the independent accountants who were also the auditors for his bank. This director, therefore,
had at least a reasonable basis for relying on the company and its management. Secondly, he was present at a board meeting on May 15 when the
final amendment was signed. At this time the principal officers stated that
everything in the prospectus was correct. Yet, according to the court, the
director did not establish his due diligence defense. Two conclusions flow
from this holding. First, a general inquiry of officers of the company and
the officers' representations to the effect that all information in the prospectus was correct and accurate did not in the circumstances constitute
"Id. at 687.
lsld. at 688.
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reasonable investigation. Second, an investigation of the general affairs of
the company vis-i-vis the specific matters covered in the prospectus did
not constitute reasonable investigation.
It is interesting to contrast this holding with the statement of a former
chairman of the SEC:
Under some circumstances [the 'prudent man' standard] would require
personal knowledge of the facts assumed to be true. Delegation to others of
the duty to verify the facts would under other circumstances suffice to meet
the requirements. A director, for example, would have little excuse for not
having personal knowledge of what his stock holdings in the issuer and its
subsidiaries were, but he should obviously be entitled to rely upon his fellow
directors . . . as to what their stockholdings were .... "
Director and Company Counsel. Company counsel who worked on the
registration statement was also a director and was sued in his capacity as
a director. He had previously drafted registration statements for a stock
issue in 1959 and for certain warrants in January 1961, several months before the effective date of the debenture registration statement in question.
In considering his due ,diligence defenses the court stated, "the unique
position which he occupied cannot be disregarded. As the director most
directly concerned with writing the registration statement and assuring its
accuracy, more was required of him in the way of reasonable investigation
than could fairly be expected of a director who had no connection with
this work.""
In preparing the registration statement, counsel worked from the previous prospectuses modifying them as he considered necessary. He obtained
information from management and relied upon his client's statements. The
court commented as follows:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his client
and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set an unreasonably
high standard. This is too broad a generalization. It is all a matter of degree.
To require an audit would obviously be unreasonable. On the other hand, to
require a check of matters easily verifiable is not unreasonable. Even honest
clients can make mistakes. The statute imposes liability for untrue statements,
regardless of whether they are intentionally untrue. The way to prevent
mistakes is to test oral information by examining the original written
record."*
The court found that counsel did not check matters which could readily
have been checked. For example, he did not read the agreements with the
factor; he did not review the contracts for orders comprising the backlog; he did not read the minutes of the subsidiaries which would have revealed that Bar Chris was in fact about to operate certain alleys; he did
not insist that certain executive committee minutes be typed for his re-

1'Landis,

Federal Securities Act and Regulations Relating to The Work and Responsibility of

the CPA, in

ADDRESS AND DISCUSSION RELATrNG TO THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACT AND ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 5-18, discussion, 19-33,

questions and answers, 33-50 (presented before the 11th Annual Fall Conference of the New York
State Society of Certified Public Accountants, Oct. 30, 1933).
20 283 F. Supp. at 690.
21

id.
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view; he did not appreciate the company's tight cash position; he did not
review customer delinquency records or make inquiries of the factoring

company. According to the court, the preponderance of evidence indicated
that company counsel-director did not make a reasonable investigation
and, accordingly, did not have a due diligence defense as to the unexpertised portion of the prospectus.
It is important to reiterate that the company counsel was sued in his

capacity as a director and signer of the registrationstatement. Presumably
there would have been no basis of suit if company counsel had not been a
director. In his capacity as company counsel and preparer of the registration statement, counsel followed what might be described as conventional, accepted procedures. He reviewed previous registration statements
(one of which had been filed only several months prior and thus in normal
circumstances could be considered as reasonably current with respect to
many matters). He made inquiries of his client and requested and obtained
the information for the registration statement. The fact that he did not
require executive committee minutes to be written up (after inquiring orally as to what transpired), that he did not make inquiries of the factor,
or that he did not review accounting records and thus failed to appreciate
the seriousness of the delinquency situation and the tight cash position
cannot be regarded as unusual for a company counsel." Traditionally, the
principal task of company counsel has been to assist the management of the
issuer in gathering the requisite information and drafting the registration
statement in acceptable format.
However, as this case indicates, company counsel who also serves as a
director assumes far greater risks and responsibilities. Like any other signer,
he must make a reasonable investigation and have reasonable grounds to believe that the unexpertised portions are true and do not omit any material
facts. Furthermore, because of his unique position as preparer of the registration statement, he must perform an investigation more thorough than
that expected of directors who have no connection with writing the registration statement and assuring its accuracy. In this regard, Judge McLean established, at least in part, standards for reasonable investigation and
grounds for belief. The standards are: (1) oral information must be tested
by examining the original written record; and (2) matters readily verifiable should be checked.

The Defendants-Underwriters and Experts
The Underwriters. The court held that the underwriters, including a
partner of the managing underwriter who was a director of Bar Chris,
were entitled to rely on the 1960 audited figures. However, their investigation into the other portions of the prospectus was not adequate ("reasonable") under the circumstances and, accordingly, they did not establish
their due diligence defenses.
The underwriters other than the "'lead" underwriter made no investigam Such procedures as requiring executive committee minutes to be written up undoubtedly vary

depending upon counsel and the circumstances.
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tion of the accuracy of the prospectus, relying instead upon' the "lead"
underwriter. The underwriting syndicate was held bound by the "lead"
underwriter's failure. Thus, the court deemed it "unnecessary to decide"
whether, if the managing underwriter had made a reasonable investigation,
the other underwriters would have been protected.
The lead underwriter did make an investigation. Its partner handling the
work (a) familiarized himself with general conditions in the industry,
primarily by reading reports and prospectuses of the two leading bowling
alley builders, AMF and Brunswick, (b) read the 1959 Bar Chris prospectus, annual reports and unaudited financial statements, (c) inquired
of several banks and of Bar Chris's factor and received favorable replies,
(d) obtained a Dun & Bradstreet report, (e) interviewed the principal
officers, and (f) attended three meetings to discuss the prospectus with
Bar Chris's representatives and company and underwriters' counsel. At one
meeting a representative of the independent accountants was present. At
these meetings, the information in the prospectus was discussed extensively
and the chief financial officer of Bar Chris was specifically interrogated regarding the accuracy of information in the prospectus relating to officer
loans, reserve for bad debts, backlog, delinquency experience, application
of proceeds, contingent liabilities, operation of alleys, etc. The underwriters' representative and underwriters' counsel received what they considered
to be satisfactory answers to their inquiries.
The court held that much of the investigation for the underwriters had
been made by their counsel, that counsel did not sufficiently verify management's statements and representations, and that the underwriters were
bound by the insufficiency of counsel's investigation. In denying due diligence defense as to the unexpertised portions, the court stated:
It is clear that no effectual attempt at verification was made. The question
is whether due diligence required that it be made. Stated another way, is it

sufficient to ask questions, to obtain answers which, if true, would be thought
satisfactory, and to let it go at that, without seeking to ascertain from the
records whether the answers are in fact true and complete.
The underwriters say that the prospectus is the company's prospectus, not
theirs. Doubtless this is the way they customarily regard it. But the Securities
Act makes no such distinction. The underwriters are just as responsible as the
company if the prospectus is false. And prospective investors rely upon the
reputation of the underwriters in deciding whether to purchase the securities."

The court noted that, "[i]n a sense, the positions of the underwriters
and the company's officers are adverse.""* Statements by company officers
to an underwriter may be self-serving, unduly enthusiastic or deliberately
false. Thus, the underwriters are thrust into a position vis-1-vis the company officers not unlike the position of independent accountants. The
standards for underwriters set forth by the court are rather clear: "Underwriters [under section 11] are made responsible for the truth of the pros23 283 F. Supp. at 696.

94 Id.
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pectus .... In order to make the underwriters' participation in this enterprise of any value to the investors, the underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data submitted to them."'
Procedurally speaking, the court stated that it is impossible to lay down
a rigid rule suitable for every case defining the extent to which such verification must go. It is a question of degree, a matter of judgment in each
case.26
Independent Accountants. The independent accountants were sued as
experts. They pleaded the affirmative defense provided under section 11 (b) (3) (B); namely, that at the time the registration statement became effective they had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe
and did believe that the statements made in the registration statement on
their authority as experts were true and that there were no omissions of
material facts.
The court previously had ruled that the only portions of the registration statement which were made on the authority of experts were the 1960
(and prior years) audited financial statements. The issue, therefore, was
whether at the time the registration statement became effective the independent accountants, after reasonable investigation, had reasonable ground

to believe and did believe that the 1960 figures were true and that no material fact had been omitted from the registration statement which should
have been included in order to make the 1960 figures not misleading. The
accountants' reasonable investigation included their 1960 audit and the
subsequent period or "S-1 review" undertaken to determine if there were
any developments subsequent to the effective date which would have a
material bearing on the 1960 audited financial statements or which should

be disclosed in order to make the statements not misleading.
The accountants also issued a so-called "comfort letter" to the underwriters. As is typical, the letter was issued solely for the information of
the underwriters and thus the representations in the letter and basis thereof
were not at issue except as they related to the crossclaims which the various defendants asserted against each other.
The court concluded that the 1960 audit procedures were deficient because they failed to disclose various misstatements. However, the misstatements in the 1961 unaudited figures and the developments in the period
subsequent to December 31, 1960 to the effective date of the registration
statement (May 1961) were much more significant in the overall picture.
Accountants have no responsibility under section 11 for such subsequent unaudited data and developments except to the extent that disclosure of such material is required in order to make the audited figures not
misleading. Accordingly, the court focused its attention on the so-called
"S-1 review" made by the accountants. Such a review covers events subsequent to the date of a certified balance sheet. Its purpose is to ascertain
whether any material change has occurred in the company's financial position which should be disclosed in order to prevent the most recent audited
2Id.

28 Id.

at 697.
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balance sheet (and related statements) from being misleading. The scope
of such a review, under generally accepted auditing standards, is limited.
It does not amount to a complete audit."
The independent accountants prepared a program for their S-1 review
which the court held conformed to generally accepted auditing standards.
Unfortunately, the program was not reproduced in its entirety in the opinion. However, certain key steps contained in the program were set forth.
Generally these steps contemplated review of minutes and interim financial
statements and inquiries regarding various matters. Certain steps, such as
one requiring a "review" of the "more important financial records," clearly went beyond what most accountants would consider generally accepted
procedures for a subsequent events review.
The court noted that, while the written program for the review of subsequent events was adequate, the independent accountants had not adequately carried out the program steps:
He [the representative of the independent accountants] did not examine any
'important financial records' other than the trial balance. As to minutes, he
read only what minutes [the secretary] gave him, which consisted only of the
board of directors' minutes of Bar Chris. He did not read such minutes as
there were of the executive committee.
In substance, what [the accountant] did is similar to what [the lawyers]
did. He asked questions, he got answers which he considered satisfactory, and
he did nothing to verify them.
There had been a material change for the worse in Bar Chris's financial position. That change was sufficiently serious so that the failure to disclose it
made the 1960 figures misleading. [The accountant] did not discover it.
As far as results were concerned, his S-I review was useless.
Accountants should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in
their profession. I do not do so here. [The accountant's] review did not
come up to that standard. He did not take some of the steps which [the
firm's] written program prescribed. He did not spend an adequate amount of
time on a task of this magnitude. [He spent twenty and one-half hours.]
" Under generally accepted auditing standards independent accountants would ordinarily undertake the following procedures in such a review: (1) Read the entire prospectus and review other
pertinent portions of the registration statement. (2) Read the latest available interim financial
statements and compare with the corresponding statements of the preceding year. Obtain explanations for significant fluctuations (usually limited to inquiry of company officers). (3) Read the
minutes of meetings of stockholders, directors and committees of officers or directors and inquire as
to matters dealt with in meetings as to which minutes are not available. (4) Obtain a representation
letter from management as to whether there have occurred any events in the subsequent period
which would have a material effect on the financial statements or require disclosure in the notes
thereto. (5) Inquire of officers and other executives having accounting or financial responsibilities
as to: (a) Consistency of application of accounting principles in the interim statements read in
step (2). (b) Whether all adjustments necessary for a fair presentation have been made in such
statements. (c) Any adjustments other than for normal recurring items during the subsequent
period. (d) Any substantial contingent liabilities or commitments existing at the interim date.
(e) Any adverse change in financial position or results of operations or changes in capitalization
subsequent to the date of the certified financial statements. (f) The current status of items accounted for on the basis of tentative, preliminary or inconclusive data.
See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING
PROCEDURE No. 33: AUDITING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES 78-80. (1963).
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Most important of all, he was too easily satisfied with glib answers to his
inquiries.
That is not to say that he should have made a complete audit. But there were
enough danger signals in the materials which he did examine to require some
further investigation on his part.... It is not always suflicient merely to ask
questions."'
III. REGISTRATION PROCEDURE IN LIGHT OF BAR CHRIS
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, procedures and techniques
utilized in preparing and investigating the contents of registration statements should be re-examined in light of the Bar Chris decision. The following are the author's views as to some of the procedural changes which
may be anticipated in the aftermath of Bar Chris.
Scope of Investigation. The outside directors, underwriters, and certain officers failed to establish their due diligence defenses in Bar Chris because
they failed to make investigations of sufficient scope to provide "reasonable
ground for belief." While many questions remain unanswered, it seems
clear that these parties must undertake an investigation of the matters
covered in the registration statement. The degree of investigation will
undoubtedly continue to vary depending on the position and role of the
person involved and the circumstances. What hurt the defendants so seriously in Bar Chris was their failure to make a real investigation of the
contents of the registration statement, particularly those portions outside
their immediate areas of responsibility. Several defendants failed to read
the prospectus at all.
In the case of outside directors and certain officers whose responsibilities
limit their knowledge principally to a particular functional area (such as
sales), it appears reasonable to the author (who is speaking as a non-lawyer) that they would want to be in the position of having (1) read the entire registration statement for items of-information or facts which are inconsistent with their personal knowledge or for omissions of materially important information known to them, and (2) attended a meeting with the
officers, independent accountants, and counsel for the company- to discuss
the contents of the registration statement and procedures employed in
gathering data and to ask questions concerning recent financial data, contingencies, etc. Such a meeting would have an additional benefit for all
parties involved in that any important inconsistencies in the knowledge or
understanding of the parties or any matters having a bearing on the registration statement would tend to be brought to light. For such a meeting
to be meaningful, the full registration statement and a brief statement as
to the scope of the directors' responsibilities should be mailed or otherwise
provided to the directors in advance of the meeting.
In the case of the lead underwriter (which may act through its counsel),
we may infer the following procedural implications and standards of in28 283 F. Supp. at 702, 703 (emphasis added).
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vestigation. First, the underwriters (and/or counsel in their behalf) may
not rely solely on representations of and information furnished by the
company's officers or on the company's counsel. Second, the underwriters
should insist that corporate minutes be complete and such records should
be reviewed by counsel for the underwriters. Third, all significant contracts and agreements referred to in the prospectus should be reviewed. All
information and representations of management should be tested by reference to the applicable records and documents or otherwise when the representations are significant and testing is practicable. Fourth, financial data
presented in the unexpertised portion of the prospectus such as sales figures, amount of contingent liabilities, officers' salaries and other remuneration, delinquency experience, research and development or training costs,
etc., should be discussed with the independent auditors and, to the extent
practicable, covered by a letter similar to the present "comfort" letter
which usually deals with unaudited "stub" periods or adverse changes in
financial position subsequent to the latest audit date and other matters."
There are also certain non-accounting data which may be expertised or on
which comfort may be obtained; for example, patent status may be expertised by patent counsel, and natural gas or other mineral reserves may be
expertised by a petroleum engineer.
The UnderwritingGroup and the Due Diligence Meeting. A so-called "due
diligence" meeting is held, usually after a registration statement is filed but
before it becomes effective, under the auspices of the lead underwriter for
the purpose of enabling the m.mbers of the underwriting group to exercise "due diligence." At the meeting questions are addressed to representatives of management, counsel for the company, the lead underwriter and
its counsel, and the independent accountants and other experts, if any,
regarding any matters discussed in the registration statement or otherwise
relating to the company, its business, etc.
The Bar Chris decision did not deal with the question of whether the
underwriting group would be protected if the lead underwriter makes a
reasonable investigation and the members of the group establish that they
relied on the lead underwriter's investigation. However, it seems clear that
underwriters are assuming such is the case in the absence of any holding
to the contrary. In light of Bar Chris, it appears important to the author
for each member of the underwriting group to observe the following procedures: (1) read the registration statement and other information available regarding the company, industry, products, etc.; (2) attend the due
diligence meeting, asking questions raised from a reading of the registration statement and study of other material; and (3) obtain a copy of the
"comfort letter" which should be as inclusive as practicable. This degree
of investigation reflects the opinion expressed a number of years ago by the
then chairman of the SEC regarding the scope of "reasonable investigation"
depending upon the position of the person involved in a registration:
The types of data on which accountants may be expected to give "comfort" or negative assurance are discussed in a later section.
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The type of investigation which can reasonably be demanded of the sponsoring or principal underwriters is one thing; that which the Act requires of
the small participating underwriter in order that he shall satisfy its requirements is another thing; while an even less standard of investigation would be
demanded of the dealer selling on commission, who, because of his relationship
to the issuer, is considered as an underwriter by the Act.'
Special Representations by Accountants. The Bar Chris decision has already had a significant impact on the work performed by independent accountants. It is apparent that underwriters are going to request that the
independent accountants perform additional work with respect to matters
in the text of the registration statement which relate to the accounting
records or data.
Certain underwriters, as a matter of practice, have requested that the
accountants' "comfort" letter include, in addition to representations as to
the financial statements, representations with respect to other matters contained in a registration statement or prospectus, such as capitalization and
remuneration of officers and directors.
It is the author's opinion that accountants should be willing to extend
comfort to information which is derived from the company's accounting
records. Such items as capitalization, compensation, research expenses, certain sales analyses, delinquency experience, etc., fall into this category. Such
information is contained in the accounting records and is subject to the
normal controls inherent in a double entry historical accounting system.
On the other hand, the accountant would not normally extend comfort to
such items as backlog of business and certain types of commitments. While
the auditor can review procedures surrounding the compilation of backlog, the amount of backlog is not controlled and balanced through the
financial accounting records and the auditor should therefore not be expected to arrive at an opinion as to the aggregate amount.
As a result of Bar Chris, accountants have carefully reviewed the wording of comfort letters and two changes may be expected. First, accountants
will be more precise in setting forth the specific steps performed; second,
warnings as to the limitations of such special review procedures and degree
of responsibility assumed will be set forth more emphatically. Recent comfort letters illustrate these points."
"'See J. Landis, Address before New York State Society of CPA's, October 30, 1933, supra
note 19.
3'The following excerpts from a recent comfort letter illustrate the emphasis on (1) more
precisely describing specific review procedures and (2) warning the reader of the limitations of
special review procedures and degree of responsibility assumed by the auditor:
Our examination of the Company's financial statements as set forth in our opinion
contained in the Prospectus comprised audit tests and procedures deemed necessary
for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the financial statements taken as a whole.
We did not perform audit tests for the purpose of expressing an opinion on individual
balances or summaries of selected transactions and accordingly we express no opinion
thereon. However, at your request we have performed the following additional
procedures. These procedures, which were applied as appropriate in testing the items
enumerated [below], consisted of:
Procedures
Items
1. Inspected underlying supporting documents for all
5-Caeitalization
changes in the capital structure from June 30, 1968
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Coordination of Preparer, Underwriter, Underwriters' Counsel and Independent Accountants. Post-Bar Chris experience indicates that there will
be greater emphasis on coordinating the efforts of counsel and independent
accountants and a much greater flow of communication between these
parties. This is a healthy development. In the past, as in the Bar Chris case,
the preparation of a registration statement and related documents was often
divided, with the drafting of the text and various agreements assigned to
representatives of counsel for the company and counsel for the underwriters and the audited financial statements and earnings summary assigned to the accountants. It was not uncommon for there to be relatively
little communication between these parties as they performed their respective tasks.
As discussed previously, attorneys and underwriters are requesting that
accountants provide assurances regarding various textual information of
an accounting nature. Accountants' views are being solicited informally to
a greatly increased extent on other matters included in the registration
to the date of the capitalization table.
2. Reviewed proposed capitalization at completion of offering for consistency with disclosures made in the
"Use of Proceeds" section of the Prospectus.
9-Business
For the Six Months Ended June 30, 1968
Sales and competition
(insofar as it relates to 1. Obtained company prepared analyses of general ledger
sales accounts which were grouped into those categories
the table summarizing
appearing on page 10 of the Prospectus, checked
the Company's net sales
mathematical accuracy, and agreed to the general
to categories of cusledger- account.
tomers)
2. Selected for all sales categories . . . 100 sales entries
supporting the analyses and inspected the underlying
source documents.
3. Reviewed the selected sales entries for propriety of the
assigned sales classification.
Periods Prior to January 1, 1968
[Work enumerated.]
26-Recent sales of unregis- 1. Agreed applicable information contained in this section
to the notes to the Financial Statements set forth in
lered securities
the Prospectus covered by our opinion dated August
(insofar as it relates to
12, 1968, and determined that no pertinent informathe date of sale and the
tion contained in the aforementioned financial statetitle and amount of sements has been omitted from this item.... The dates
curities sold)
of applicable transactions which are not specifically included in the Notes to the Financial Statements, were
otherwise substantiated by inspection of source documents.
30-Treatment of Proceeds 1. Reviewed the Company's proposed treatment for adherence to generally accepted accounting principles
of stock being registered
and consistency with previous offerings.
It should be understood that the above additional procedures would not necessarily
reveal any misstatement of amounts included in the items listed above, such as could
result from exclusion of transactions from those places in the Company's records
where we would most logically expect to find them. Subject to this explanation
and based upon (1) our examination of the Company's financial statements as set
forth in our opinion dated August 12, 1968, (2) our limited review described [in
another section of the letter not reproduced] and (3) the additional procedures
carried out at your request, set forth above, nothing has come to our attention
which in our judgment would indicate that the accounting information set forth
under the items listed above would require any material adjustment necessary for a
fair presentation of the information purported to be shown.
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statement. This appears to be a very logical development because the accountant should be better informed regarding the affairs of the company
than any other outside party. As one noted authority has observed:
In the usual case, except for the management representatives, there are few
persons connected with the [registration procedure] who are as familiar with
the company and its affairs as the independent public accountants. In the
course of auditing the company's financial statements over the year, the
accountants could not help but acquire much information about the company, its plants, its products, its manufacturing processes and problems, its
labor situation, its distribution problems, capital needs, and similar matters.
Since these matters run to the very heart of the prospectus, the accountant
is often in a position to make important and constructive suggestions in
drafting the prospectus.... Not only does the accountant have an extensive
background in the company's affairs but, what may be equally important,
he has an independent and objective point of view. The author is not
referring now to the need for independence in order for the accountant
to be in a position to certify for SEC purposes. He is referring rather to the

essential difference in the point of view between the owners of the business
or the management on the one hand and the accountant on the other hand.
The owners and management are often inclined to be overly optimistic and
to minimize their problems. . . .The lawyer knows that the accountant is
more likely to have an objective, disinterested view of the problem ....n
The informal discussion with accountants is particularly useful in obtaining the independent viewpoint of the accountant on statements or
matters inthe registration statement on which the accountant cannot give
negative assurance because they are data of a non-accounting nature (such
as the history of the business or nature of operations).

Responsibility of Auditors for Subsequent Events. Bar Chris raises a number of serious questions for accountants insofar as subsequent events, or
so-called "S-1," reviews are concerned. The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) has officially set forth its view as to the
appropriate procedures to be followed in performing a subsequent events
review.' Such a review is based largely on review of the latest available
interim financial statements, reading of corporate minutes, and discussions with company officials. It is interesting that the written review program employed by the auditors in Bar Chris went beyond the AICPA requirements; however, its execution was deficient in several respects. In any
event, the court looked mainly to results in appraising the S-I review. The
court determined that there had been a change for the worse in the subsequent period, and the failure to disclose the change made the certified
statements misleading. Therefore, insofar as results were concerned, the
S-1 review actually performed was considered worthless by the court. This
was the real test.
A disturbing aspect of the opinion is its implication that accountants
should review the accounting data right up to the effective date. Some of
the misstatements, such as the credit (i.e., negative) balances in the cash
n L.
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SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 9.5 (2d ed. 1966).
PROCEDURE No. 33, supra note 27, at 78-80.
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account and the existence of officers' loans, apparently occurred after the
date of the latest available interim financial statements but before the effective date. The discovery of such misstatements would not typically result from normal review procedure, and, indeed, review procedures would
have to be extended considerably to give even reasonable assurance of discovery of such items. It seems clear that accountants will have to consider
carefully their S-1 review procedures in the light of Bar Chris.
IV.

BAR CHRIS IN PERSPECTIVE

Perhaps more than anything else, Bar Chris illustrates the role of
judgment in the registration process. Judge McLean commented that the
extent of verification is a "question of judgment" in the circumstances.
After close study of the case, one can hardly avoid the impression that ordinary procedures were applied to highly unusual and complex circumstances, and such procedures simply were not adequate.
Here was a company which had experienced extremely rapid growth and
had outpaced its managerial capability. It was chronically short of cash. It
had an extraordinarily complex financial structure. It extended large
amounts of credit to financially weak concerns. Its legal draftsmanship
was "unartistic," if not downright inadequate. Its records were incomplete.
It engaged in "sharp" business practices and dealt with companies which
were identified in the internal records by more than one name. Its accounting practices were very complex (i.e., multiple financing arrangements, use
of percentage of completion method, contingent liability arrangements on
notes discounted and leases).
Accountants have long followed the procedure of reviewing the system
of internal control in order to determine the extent to which it can be relied upon to produce accurate financial data and the resultant extent of
audit testing required in the circumstances. The adequacy of records, procedures and controls, the capabilities of personnel and the capacity of management are important factors in this evaluation. The same type of assessment must be made by attorneys and underwriters in deciding upon the
extent of investigation which they consider reasonable in the circumstances.
Thus, in the final analysis, Bar Chris must be viewed in perspective. Circumstances required exceptionally thorough and penetrating investigatory
procedures. Instead, procedures less thorough and more conventional were
applied. It appears to be a serious over-reaction to apply extended investigatory procedures across the board without regard to the circumstances involved in each registration. "The assembly of data for a registration statement is an esoteric art," states one leading corporate lawyer. Bar Chrismore than anything else--demonstrates the need for careful analysis and
judgment in deciding upon procedures and techniques appropriate for
each set of circumstances.

"'Carlos Israels, quoted in The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 12, col. 3.

